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Defendants/appellants Michael Carey ("Michael") and Wendy Carey C'Wendy") 
(together, "the Careys") submit the following Brief of the Appellant. 1 
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Careys have appealed from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 
as authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78B-l l-129(l)(a). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
II. ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES 
This appeal presents the following issues for review (see R. 361-378 (preserving 
in the trial court)): 
(1) Whether the claims brought by plaintiff/respondent Joseph Edwards 
("Edwards") belong to Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. ("Seirus") and thus should be 
brought by Edwards (if at all) derivatively; 
(2) Whether the disputes raised in the first amended complaint in this action relate 
to the Careys' performance of their duties as officers/employees of Seirus and thus are 
subject to the broad arbitration agreements contained in Michael's and Wendy's written 
employment agreements; 
(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying the Careys' motion to compel 
arbitration and to stay the pending action pending arbitration . 
1 Because Michael and Wendy Carey have the same last name, this brief refers to them 
by their first names when necessary for clarity. 
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Whether a trial court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is an issue 
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the 
trial judge. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 
1986). It is the policy of the Utah Supreme Court "to interpret arbitration clauses in a 
manner that favors arbitration." Id. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal is based on the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., which is 
set forth verbatim in the Appendix to this brief. 
IV. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Edwards filed his complaint against the Careys and Seirus in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County on July 29, 2015. (R. 1-12.) Five days later, 
Edwards filed a motion for temporary restraining order, which the court denied on 
August 7, 2015. (R. 25-27; 304-305.) Edwards filed a first amended complaint on 
August 21, 2015. (R. 310-326.) 
Thereafter, on September 21, 2015, the Careys moved the trial court to compel 
arbitration and stay proceedings pending arbitration. (R. 331-333; 361-379.) The court 
issued its memorandum decision denying the motion to compel arbitration on 
December 11, 2015. (R. 567-571.) The Careys timely appealed on December 28, 2015. 
(R. 572-574.) After appealing, the Careys filed a motion in the trial court to stay 
proceedings pending the appeal, which the court denied. (R. 603-614.) 
2 
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V. SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Because some of the issues on appeal involve the nature of the claims brought by 
Edwards and the history of the relationship between the parties, a more thorough review 
of the facts underlying the litigation is set forth below. 
A. Seirus Is Formed 
In 1985, Michael and Edwards incorporated a company under the laws of Utah, 
dedicated to engineering, licensing, and developing cutting edge products for winter 
sport, outdoor activity, tactical, hunting, workwear, and cold weather activity markets. 
(R. 382 ~ 4; 384 ~ 9.) The company, named Seirus, does business throughout the United 
States and also internationally, with registered trademarks in both. (R. 386 ~ 13; 312 
~ 11.) 
At the time of incorporation, Michael and Edwards each owned 50% of Seirus' 
stock. (See R. 311 ~ 9.) Currently, Michael owns 55.44% and Edwards owns 44.56% of 
the company's stock. (R.382-3831~ 2, 6.) Michael, Edwards, and Wendy (Michael's 
wife) have always been the only three directors on the Seirus Board of Directors. (R. 383 
,I 6.) 
B. The Duties of Seirus' Officers 
Seirus' Bylaws govern the company's decision-making process and specify the 
powers of the Board. (R.384-3851 10.) The Bylaws also establish the company's 
officer positions and their roles within the company. For example: 
• Article IV, Section 6, subsection (a) states that the "president shall, subject 
to the direction and supervision of the board of directors, (i) be the chief 
executive officer of the corporation and have general and active control of 
3 
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its affairs and business and general supervision of its officers, agents and 
employees; (ii) unless there is a chairman of the board, preside at all 
meetings of the shareholders and board of directors; (iii) see that all orders 
and resolutions of the board of directors are carried into effect; and 
(iv) perform all other duties incident to the office of the president and as 
from time to time may be assigned to him by the board of directors." (R. 
410-411.) 
• Article IV, Section 6, subsection (b) provides the vice-president role is 
optional. (R. 411.) 
• Article IV, Section 6, subsections ( c) and ( d) define the duties of the 
secretary and treasurer to include keeping the company's records and 
minutes, providing stockholder notices, updating and safekeeping the 
company's stock ledger, and handling the company's accounts and 
finances. (R. 411-412.) 
Currently, Michael is the company's president and chief executive officer, and 
Wendy is its secretary, treasurer and chief financial officer. (R. 382 ilil 2, 5.) Consistent 
with the business of the company, Michael's and Wendy's officer positions require them 
to engage in interstate commerce. (R. 386 il 13; 464 il 5.) 
C. Seirus' Employees 
Although the company was incorporated in Utah, Seirus is based in San Diego, 
California and its only offices are there. (R. 382 il 3.) Its 60 employees also all work in 
San Diego at the company offices. Id. 
Michael is employed full-time in the San Diego office and is primarily responsible 
for the company's day-to-day operations. (R. 382 il 2.) Wendy also is employed full-
time in the San Diego office and is responsible for managing the company's finances, 
including its accounts and funds, receiving payment for amounts owed to the company, 
and keeping accurate financial and accounting records for the company. (R. 382-383 
4 
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1 5.) Wendy also assists in managing various departments of Seirus, and manages the IT 
department in particular. Id. 
Edwards, on the other hand, lives in Utah and has never worked full-time for 
Seirus. (R.38317.) In 1987 and again in 1993, responsibility for the limited areas of 
the company that Edwards had managed for a few years (sales, some production) was 
transferred to Michael in San Diego. Id. Although Edwards began working an average 
of 10 hours a week in San Diego starting in 2000, he has not managed any employees for 
over a decade. Id. During that time, he was responsible only for overseeing company 
legal affairs, public relations, advertising, and executive searches. Id. By the summer of 
2015, Edwards had stopped working out of the San Diego office and was no longer doing 
any significant amount of work for the company. Id. 
D. Edwards Is Terminated as an Officer 
Over the last few years, Michael observed how Edwards put his own interests 
ahead of those of the company. (R. 387114.) For example, between 2004 and 2012 
Michael loaned Seirus $4,745,092 and Edwards loaned the company $3,020,606, at 
interest rates between 4.25% and 10%. (R. 387 ~ 15.) When on October 2, 2013 the 
company's lender required Michael and Edwards to suspend payment of interest and 
principal on their insider loans, they agreed to do so. (R. 387116.) After the lender 
removed its restrictions on April 7, 2014, Michael believed it was in the best interests of 
Seirus to permanently reduce the interest rate on the shareholder promissory notes to 
4.25% and he asked Edwards multiple times to do so. (R. 3871 17.) Putting his own 
interests ahead of those of the company, Edwards continually rebuffed Michael's 
5 
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suggestions to even meet to discuss the matter, and he continues to insist on personally 
receiving an above-market interest rate from the company. Id. 
At Seirus' annual shareholder meeting on May 20, 2015, Edwards attempted to 
vote himself as the sole director of the Board. (R. 3 88 ,I 19.) Michael blocked his 
attempt. Id. However, because both Michael and Edwards were 50% shareholders at the 
time, their deadlock prevented them from electing any new members to the Board. Id. 
Two months later, on July 10, 2015, Edwards sued Seirus to recover interest 
allegedly due under his notes with the company. (R. 388 ,I 18 [Joseph H. Edwards v. 
Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., Third Judicial District Court for Sale Lake County, 
State of Utah, Case No. 150904602].) In his business judgment as president and CEO, 
Michael determined that Edwards was no longer capable of neutrally serving as an officer 
of Seirus and that it was time to take action to protect the company's business. (R. 388 
11 18, 20.) 
On July 27, 2015, the Board held a special meeting to address the company's 
deadlock and other pressing issues affecting Seirus' business. (R.3891121, 22.) As 
president and CEO, Michael recommended that the Board remove Edwards from his 
position as an officer of Seirus, appoint Wendy as the company's secretary and treasurer, 
authorize a company project involving the licensing of Seirus' technology, and authorize 
a debt for equity exchange between the company and its stockholders. (R. 389 ,I 22.) 
Michael recommended that the Board remove Edwards as an officer for three primary 
reasons: (1) Edwards could no longer faithfully serve Seirus while at the same time sue 
the company to recover excessive, above-market interest purportedly owed to him by 
6 
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• 
Seirus; (2) Edwards engaged in fraudulent activity detrimental to the company as detailed 
in the minutes; and (3) Edwards engaged in many instances of gross mismanagement and 
usurped corporate opportunities contrary to the interests of the company. (R. 389 ,r 23.) 
The Board approved and adopted all of Michael's recommendations and Edwards was no 
longer an officer of the company, although he retained his position on the Board. (R. 389 
,r 22; 43~56.) 
E. The Board Also Approved an Equity Exchange Offering 
At the July 27, 2015 Board meeting, the Board also voted to approve an Equity 
Exchange Offering as being in the best interests of the Company. (R. 390 ,r 25.) At that 
time, Seirus owed over $6.8 million to its shareholders. Id. As CEO, it was Michael's 
recommendation that an equity exchange would allow Seirus to capitalize itself without 
having to raise funds to repay the debt, increasing cash flow, decreasing expenses and 
increasing profits by eliminating its interest payments. Id. Reducing the debt had a 
number of other anticipated benefits, including: (I) providing the company greater 
flexibility in its financing options and securing its relationship with its lender for a 
smooth loan renewal anticipated in August 2015 with more favorable covenants; 
(2) providing more flexibility and liquidity in dealing with on-going, high-exposure 
patent litigation with Columbia Sports, a billion dollar opponent; (3) protecting against 
shareholder unrest; (4) preventing self-interested shareholder actions seeking collection 
and/or enforcement of the debt, such as the action Edwards initiated against the company. 
Id. In Michael's business judgment, the Equity Exchange Offering would increase the 
7 
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value of the company to the benefit of both shareholders. Id. Both shareholders were 
equally able to choose whether to participate in the Equity Exchange Offering. 
Three days after the Board approved the Equity Exchange Offering, Michael 
elected to cancel $3,782,960.92 of principal debt Seirus owed to him in exchange for 
152.54 shares of the Company (at $24,800.00 per share). (R. 390 ,r 26.) Though he 
could have done so, Edwards chose not to elect to convert any of his debt into company 
equity. Id. As a result, Michael currently owns 55.44% of the company's stock and 
Edward owns the remaining 44.56%. Id. 
F. Edwards Files This Lawsuit, His Second Against the Company 
Edwards filed this lawsuit against the Careys and Seirus, on July 29, 2015, two 
days after the July 27 Board meeting. (R. 1-10.) His complaint contained causes of 
action for conflict of interest transactions, breach of fiduciary duty, removal of directors 
pursuant to Utah Code § 16-1 0a-809, and request for declaratory judgment. Id. His 
prayer for relief sought "an order fonn the Court declaring void ... : ( 1) the termination 
of Edwards as an employee and officer of the company; and (2) the plan to convert 
shareholder debt to additional shareholder equity (or any other stock issuances)", 
damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment interest, "an order from the Court removing 
Defendant Michael Carey and Defendant Wendy Carey as directors of the Company", 
and "a declaration of rights" as set forth in the complaint. (R. 9-10.) 
Edwards moved for a temporary restraining order less than a week after filing his 
complaint. (R. 25-27.) In his motion, he asked the court to enter: 
8 
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• 
1. An order prohibiting Seirus, Mike Carey and Wendy Carey from taking any 
steps to implement the Equity Exchange Offering, or any other action that 
would cause Edwards' ownership interest in Seirus to fall below fifty percent; 
2. An order prohibiting Seirus, Mike Carey and Wendy Carey from tenninating 
Edwards' authority as an officer of Seirus or from interfering with his 
reasonable access to company property, including his corporate email; and 
3. An order that actions taken by the Board of Directors require the unanimous 
vote of all Board Members, including Edwards, pending the resolution of this 
matter on the merits or further order of the Court. 
(R. 27.) The trial court denied the motion on August 7, 2015. (R. 304-305.) 
Edwards filed a first amended complaint on August 21, 2015, adding a claim for 
deprivation of preemptive rights. (R. 310-324.) His prayer for relief essentially did not 
change. (R. 323.) 
G. Michael and Wendy Move to Compel Arbitration 
Defendants Michael and Wendy thereafter filed a motion to compel arbitration and 
stay proceeding. (R. 331-332.) They argued Edwards' complaint asserts derivative 
claims belonging to Seirus and accuses the Careys of misconduct arising, at least in part, 
from their duties as employees. Id. Both Michael's and Wendy's employment 
agreements with Seirus contain broad arbitration clauses that require any dispute between 
them and Seirus to be arbitrated in San Diego, California by the American Arbitration 
Association in compliance with its Commercial Rules of Arbitration. Id. The arbitration 
agreements read, in relevant part, as follows: 
12. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and 
the Employee agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of or 
relating to any interpretation, construction, perfonnance, or breach of this 
Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration ... 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 424 (Michael's agreement); 474 (Wendy's agreement).) Edwards' claims against the 
Careys relate directly to the performance of their duties as officers and employees of 
Seirus and therefore fall within the scope of the Careys' binding arbitration agreements 
with Seirus. (See R. 332.) The Careys filed their motion to compel because Edwards had 
not responded to the Careys' written request to arbitrate Edwards' claims in San Diego. 
Id. 
On December 11, 2015, the trial court denied the Careys' motion in a 
Memorandum Decision. (R. 567-570.) The court indicated it must resolve two questions 
to determine whether the arbitration provision applies: (I) whether the Careys' actions 
come within the scope of the employment agreements, and (2) whether Edwards' claims 
are derivative. (R. 569.) As to the first question, the court stated "[t]he Careys are 
correct that because of the Company's management structure and their overlapping roles 
as directors and officers, it may be difficult to precisely determine which hat they were 
wearing at different times. It may even be the case that the Careys' work as corporate 
officers led them to recommend and ultimately approve the proposed actions in 
question." Id. Despite this ambiguity, the court sided with Edwards' argument that he 
had alleged his claims "primarily" against the Careys for their actions as directors of 
Seirus. (R. 569-570.) As a result, the court found the employment agreements do not 
govern Edwards' claims, and thus never addressed whether Edwards' claims are 
derivative. (R. 570.) The Careys appealed. (R. 572-573.) 
10 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Careys had valid arbitration agreements as part of their employment contracts 
with Seirus that require arbitration of all claims arising from the performance of their 
duties as employees of the company. The Careys' arbitration agreements are governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") because both Seirus and the Careys are engaged 
in interstate commerce. The FAA' s purpose is to promote arbitration and to ensure that 
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. Utah law is in agreement, 
resolving disputes as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through 
arbitration or litigation in favor of encouraging arbitration. 
Edwards' claims must be arbitrated under the Careys' arbitration agreements with 
Seirus for two reasons. First, the claims Edwards raises in his complaint are not his own 
direct claims but rather are derivative claims belonging to the company. Second, his 
claims relate to allegedly wrongful actions taken by the Careys as part of their role as 
officers of the company. Therefore, the claims in Edwards' complaint come within the 
arbitration agreements in the Careys' employment contracts because they arise out of or 
relate to the performance of the Careys' contracts. Where a valid arbitration agreement 
exists that covers the dispute in question, the court must compel arbitration. See Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-68, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
The trial court, however, found the Careys' arbitration agreements did not apply 
because it found Edwards' claims, based on how Edwards chose to frame them in the 
complaint, are "primarily" asserted against the Careys for actions they took as directors 
of the company and not as officers. (R. 569-570.) Because of that finding, the court 
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never addressed the second issue - whether Edwards' claims are derivative or direct in 
nature. (R. 570.) The trial court erred in finding the arbitration agreement does not 
apply. Its order denying the Careys' motion to compel arbitration should be reversed and 
the matter should be ordered to arbitration. Further, the trial court action should be 
stayed pending completion of the arbitration. 
A. 
VII. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Careys' Arbitration Agreements Are Governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act 
As a fundamental matter, the Careys' arbitration agreements are governed by the 
FAA, which applies to all arbitration agreements "evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 
115 S. Ct. 834 ( 1995). "Employment contracts, except for those covering workers 
engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA." E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 
U.S. 279, 289, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002) (internal citations omitted); see also Int'! Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, Local 111 v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, 773 F.3d 1100, 1106 (10th Cir. 
2014) (same). "Agreements to arbitrate that fall within the scope and coverage of the 
[FAA] ... must be enforced in state and federal courts." KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, _ U.S. 
_, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24(2011) (emphasis added). 
Seirus engages in interstate commerce. Its business extends throughout the United 
States and internationally. (R. 312 ~ 11.) As a result, the Careys' management of Seirus' 
business also heavily involves interstate commerce. For example, as the company's 
president and CEO, Michael regularly travels outside of California to attend to Seirus' 
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business. (R.3861 13.) He also represents Seirus at national tradeshows and has 
directed promotion of Seirus' products in media outlets located in California, Utah, 
Denver, Washington, and New York, among others. Id. Wendy's activities as the 
secretary, treasurer, and CFO of Seirus also involve interstate commerce. (R.46415.) 
As an officer of Seirus, Wendy has attended tradeshows in Nevada, Utah, and Colorado, 
among other U.S. states. Id. Moreover, as the company's secretary, Wendy regularly 
sends stockholder notices to (and otherwise communicates with) Edwards across state 
lines. Id. Further, even the alleged wrongful acts Edwards alleges in his complaint that 
the Careys carried out took place across state lines. 
There is no dispute that the Careys' employment with Seirus affects interstate 
commerce. The arbitration clauses in the Careys' employment agreements, therefore, are 
governed by the FAA. 
B. Both Federal and Utah Law Strongly Favor Arbitration as a Method of 
Dispute Resolution 
The FAA expresses a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345-46, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (citing Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 540,443, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006)). The 
"overarching purpose of the FAA" is to promote arbitration and "ensure the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements according to their terms." See AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 344. 
"[ A ]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration .... " Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co,p., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 
103 S. Ct. 927 (1983). 
13 
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The FAA "leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a ... court but instead 
mandates that courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which 
an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213,218, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985). "State and federal courts must examine with care the 
complaints seeking to invoke their jurisdiction in order to separate arbitrable from 
nonarbitrable claims. A court may not issue a blanket refusal to compel arbitration 
merely on the grounds that some of the claims could be resolved by the court without 
arbitration." KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, supra, 132 S. Ct. at 24. The court must compel 
arbitration where a valid arbitration agreement exists that covers the dispute in question. 
See Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S at 67-68. 
In accord with the FAA, Utah law also recognizes a strong presumption in favor of 
arbitration. Mariposa Exp., Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions, LLC, 2013 UT App 28, ,, 
16-17, 295 P .3d 1173 (Utah has a "policy favoring arbitration"). The Court of Appeals 
has stated: "[I]f there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their 
disputes through arbitration or litigation, ... we interpret the agreement keeping in mind 
our policy of encouraging arbitration. It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret 
contracts in favor of arbitration, in keeping with [Utah's] policy of encouraging 
extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the parties have agreed not to litigate." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
C. Edwards' Claims Are Derivative on Behalf of Seirus 
It is true that the Careys' arbitration agreements are with the company, and not 
with Edwards. But that fact doesn't preclude the arbitration agreements from applying to 
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Edwards' claims because his claims are properly characterized as derivative claims of the 
corporation. Therefore, the claims are arbitrable even though the arbitration agreement is 
with the company and not Edwards. 
Derivative suits "are those which seek to enforce any right which belongs to the 
corporation." Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). "Actions 
alleging mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and appropriation or waste of 
corporate opportunities and assets generally belong to the corporation, and therefore, a 
shareholder must bring such actions on its behalf." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. 
Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998). 
Under limited circumstances, a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation 
may sue individually where he or she can show "an injury to him- or herself that is 
distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. Where, however, a stockholder 
"seeks by its pleading to enforce a right of the corporation," the stockholder must proceed 
derivatively. See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,I 22,216 P.3d 944 
(finding that dissenting stockholder had derivative standing as a class of one); Warner v. 
DMG Color, 2000 UT 102, ,I 15, 20 P.3d 868 (holding, in the context of a closely held 
corporation, that minority stockholder's claims for conversion and misappropriation were 
derivative because they "stem solely from his status as a corporate shareholder-the mark 
of a derivative claim"). To determine whether claims are derivative or direct, the Court 
looks at the nature of the stockholder's claims and not their labels. See Warner, 2000 UT 
102,,I 19. 
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Under these rules, Edwards' claims are derivative. Edwards contends the Careys 
have a conflict of interests and have breached their fiduciary duties by "(a) the 
tennination of [Plaintiff] as an officer and employee of the Company; and (b) the 
approval of the conversion of shareholder debt to shareholder equity program or the 
issuance of any other equity to alter the 50-50 ownership structure." (R. 319-320 ,r,r 44-
52.) The complaint frames the alleged resulting harm in terms of harm to the company 
and not Edwards individually. For example, Edwards claims the Careys "have used the 
Company for their personal advantage rather than for the benefit of all shareholders, as 
required by statute/law, including engaging in unauthorized actions and self-dealing that 
placed their interests above the Company's interests." (R. 312 ,r 14.) Edwards also 
accuses the Careys of corporate waste and mismanagement because they have allegedly 
not "act[ed] in the best interests of the Company ... [by failing to conduct] an 
independent review of executive compensation to ensure the Company was not over-
paying for executive services." (R. 316-317131.) 
Consistent with the derivative nature of his claims, Edwards' complaint does not 
seek to vindicate any personal rights he may have against the Careys or Seirus. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 0a-622(3) (Shareholders of closely held corporations have "no 
fiduciary duty or other similar duty to any other shareholder of the corporation, including 
not having a duty of care, loyalty, or utmost good faith"). For example, Edwards does 
not (and cannot) allege that he had a personal contractual right to continue his 
employment at Seirus. (See R. 386 ,r 12; 430--434.) To the contrary, Edwards complains 
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that his termination as an employee of Seirus was not "in the best interest of the 
Company." (R. 313 il 17.) 
Edwards signed the Careys' employment agreements containing the arbitration 
agreements on behalf of the company, and the agreements are binding on Edwards in his 
role as a shareholder bringing a derivative action against the Careys. See, e.g., Frederick 
v. First Union Securities, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 694, 697-698 (2002) (A corporation's 
agreement with a third party to arbitrate disputes is binding on a shareholder bringing a 
derivative action against that party); Bass v. SMG, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 492, 505-507 
(2002) ( compelling arbitration of derivative claims even though the representative 
plaintiff did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration clause). Thus, if Seirus 
would be required to arbitrate, Edward is similarly bound to arbitrate his claims. Claus v. 
Paychex, Inc., No. 0045296, 2012 WL 1669425, *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2012) 
(finding plaintiff was required to arbitrate where claims were derivative of corporation 
bound to arbitrate). As shown below, had Edwards' claims been brought directly by 
Seirus, the company would be required to arbitrate those claims. Accordingly, Edwards 
should be compelled to arbitrate the derivative claims, as well. 
D. Edwards' Claims Must Be Arbitrated Because They Arise Out of the Careys' 
Employment Contracts Which Contain the Binding Arbitration Provisions 
In light of the strong federal and state policies favoring arbitration, where there is 
a valid agreement to arbitrate, so long as the dispute falls within the scope of the 
agreement to arbitrate it must be arbitrated. See Mitsubishi Motors C01p. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 4 73 U.S. 614, 626, I 05 S. Ct. 3346 ( 1986) ("[T]he first task of a 
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court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate that dispute."). 
Here, there is a valid agreement between Seirus ( and, therefore, any stockholder 
such as Edwards representing Seirus in a derivative claim) and the Careys to arbitrate all 
disputes arising from the Careys' performance of their duties as officers of the company -
Michael as president and CEO and Wendy as secretary, treasurer and CFO. The binding 
arbitration clauses in both of the Careys' employment agreements state that: 
[Seirus] and the Employee agree that any dispute or controversy arising out 
of or relating to any interpretation, construction, performance, or breach of 
this Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration conducted by the 
American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, as then in 
effect[.] 
(R.424112; 474, 14.) 
This is the essence of a broad arbitration clause. See, e.g., Brown v. Coleman Co., 
220 F .3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) ( explaining that an arbitration clause stating "all 
disputes or controversies arising under or in connection with this Agreement ... will be 
settled exclusively by arbitration" was "the very definition of a broad arbitration clause" 
( omission in original)); Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 
252 F.3d 218, 225-27 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that phrase "[a]ny dispute arising from the 
making, performance or termination of this [agreement]," while containing limiting 
language, was "a broad arbitration clause"). The Careys' employment agreements 
contain valid and broad agreements to arbitrate. 
18 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The allegations in Edwards' first amended complaint and the evidentiary facts in 
defense of those allegations fall squarely within the scope of this broad arbitration clause 
and thus must be arbitrated. Edwards' claims all "arise out of' the Careys' 
"performance" as employees and officers of Seirus. If there is any uncertainty or 
ambiguity as to whether the claims come within the arbitration agreement, they still must 
be arbitrated. See Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995) 
("[T]o acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities must be 
resolved in favor of arbitrability") ( emphasis in original). 
Arbitrability turns on the underlying facts of a dispute, not on the legal theories a 
party advances based on those facts or the label he places on his claims. Oldroyd v. 
Elmira Sav. Bank FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1998) (Courts must focus on factual 
allegations in a complaint rather than on the legal causes of action asserted in determining 
whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement). In 
his causes of action for conflict of interests, breach of fiduciary duty, removal of director, 
and declaratory relief, Edwards accuses Michael of wrongfully "ousting Edwards as an 
officer of the Company." (See R. 313-322 ilil 17, 43-45, 49, 53-54, 63, 65.) The 
evidentiary facts in defense of these claims show that the company's CEO and president, 
Michael was empowered with managerial discretion to control and supervise the 
company's "officers, agents, and employees." (R. 382 il 2; 411.) Michael decided to 
recommend that Seirus tenninate Edwards as an officer only after repeatedly observing 
that Edwards put his own self-interests ahead of the interests of the company. (R. 387-
389 ilil 14-23.) Edwards' claims must be arbitrated because they concern his 
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termination, which "arises out of' Michael's "performance" of his duties as president and 
CEO of Seirus. 
Similarly, the causes of action in Edwards' first amended complaint arise from the 
Careys' business decision to recommend and implement the Equity Exchange Offering. 
(See R.319-3221141-42, 44-45, 49, 53-54, 58, 61, 63, 65.) In broad strokes, Edwards 
alleges that "Michael and his spouse, Wendy Carey, have used the Company for their 
personal advantage rather than for the benefit of all shareholders." (R.312114.) With 
respect to the Equity Exchange Offering, Edwards criticizes the Careys' business 
judgment regarding the company's "need for any equity infusion." (R.314122.) 
Edwards also objects to the manner in which the Careys structured, gave notice of, and 
implemented the Equity Exchange Offering. (R.314-3181120-21, 32-37.) 
Again, the Careys' efforts to develop and implement the Equity Exchange 
Offering arise from the performance of their duties as officers of Seirus. For example, as 
the company's CEO and President, it is Michael's responsibility to "have general and 
active control of [the Company's] affairs and business." (R.384110; 411.) It was in 
this capacity that Michael determined it was necessary for the company to retire its debts 
to the stockholders. (See R. 390125.) Michael decided to recommend the Equity 
Exchange Offering for sound business purposes, including improving the company's: (i) 
financing options; (ii) profitability; and (iii) quelling shareholder unrest. Id. 
Likewise, Wendy's position as secretary, treasurer, and CFO, required her to be 
intimately involved in the details of the Equity Exchange Offering. As the company's 
secretary, it was Wendy's responsibility to issue additional stock to any stockholder 
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electing to participate in the Equity Exchange Offering. (R. 464-465, 116-7.) It was 
also her responsibility to update and manage the company's stock ledger after Michael 
elected to convert the entirety of the debt owed to him by the company into equity. Id. 
Finally, as Seirus' CFO, Wendy has acted as the face of the company in its interactions 
with its primary banker (Torrey Pines Bank), which approves of the company's decision 
to retire a portion of the debt owed to Seirus' stockholders. (R. 464-465 1 6; 4 79.) 
Edwards' remaining allegations concern decisions the Careys made regarding the 
company's business strategies and the compensation of its employees. (See R. 316-317 
1130-31.) As previously discussed, the management of the company and its employees 
are also duties the Careys performed as officers of Seirus. 
At a minimum, both Edwards' allegations and the evidentiary facts submitted in 
support of the Careys' motion to compel arbitration raise an ambiguity as to whether 
Edwards' claims "arise out of' the Careys' "performance" as employees and officers of 
Seirus so that they come within the arbitration agreements. Even the trial court 
acknowledged this ambiguity when it stated the "Careys are correct" that their roles as 
officers overlapped with their roles as directors so that "it may be difficult to precisely 
determine which hat they were wearing at different times." (R. 569.) Because of the 
strong preference under the FAA and in Utah for arbitration, this uncertainty or 
ambiguity as to whether Edwards' claims come within the arbitration agreement compels 
the conclusion that Edwards' claims must be arbitrated. See Annijo, supra, 72 F.3d at 
798 ("[T]o acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities 
must be resolved in favor of arbitrability") ( emphasis in original). The trial court erred 
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when it acknowledged the ambiguity but then chose to resolve it in favor of non-
arbitrability, contrary to what the law requires. 
The Careys' employment agreements govern their relationship with Seirus. The 
Supreme Court instructs that arbitration must be ordered unless it can be said "with 
positive assurance" that a dispute is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,650, 106 S. Ct. 1415 
(1986). Here, it cannot be said with positive assurance that Edwards' claims do not touch 
on the arbitration provisions included in the Careys' employment agreements. This much 
is clear: the Careys performed their duties as officers of Seirus pursuant to those 
agreements. Therefore, Edwards' claims against the Careys must be arbitrated. 
E. The Court Should Order the Action Stayed Pending Arbitration 
Both federal and Utah law empower courts to stay proceedings involving non-
arbitrable claims pending the completion of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-108(7). In fact, under the FAA, "[a] court must stay its proceedings if it 
is satisfied that an issue before it is arbitrable ... " Shearson Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,226, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (emphasis added); Coors Brewing 
Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F .3d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995) (The FAA requires that 
courts stay "judicial proceedings where a written agreement provides for the arbitration 
of the dispute that is the subject of the litigation"); see also Mariposa Exp., supra, 2013 
UT App 28, ,I 19 (The Utah Arbitration Act requires that when a district court orders 
arbitration the court should stay the underlying lawsuit). 
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Along with reversing the order denying the Careys' motion to compel arbitration 
and ordering the motion granted instead, the Court should the stay claims, if any, it deems 
non-arbitrable. Because Edwards' claims against Careys involve a common set of facts, 
they are all inextricably intertwined and the stay should extend to all non-arbitrable 
claims. To the extent the Court decides that all claims are subject to arbitration, it may 
either stay or dismiss this action. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse the 
trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration, and on remand, order the trial 
court to instead grant the motion and dismiss or stay the action until the arbitration is 
resolved. 
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i)U.S.C. Title 9 - ARBITRATION https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg1USCODE-2014-title9/html/USCODE-20l ... 
• 
I ofl 
9 u.s.c. 
United States Code, 2014 Edition 
Title 9 - ARBITRATION 
CHAPTER I - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Sec. 2 - Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, \\'Ww.gpo.gov 
§2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
or the refusal to perfonn the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
(July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 670.) 
DERIVATION 
Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §2, 43 Stat. 883 . 
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11.. NOTICES. Any notices to be given hereunder by either party to the other 
shall be in writing and may be transmitted by persona] delivery or by mail, registered or 
certified, postage prepaid with return receipt requested. Notices delivered personally 
shall be deemed communicated as of the date of the actual receipt; mailed notices shall be 
deemed communicated as of three (3) days after mailing. Mailed notices shall be 
addressed as follows: 
(a) In the case ofEmployer, 13975 Danielson Street, Poway, California 92064, 
or to such other person or address as Employer may from time to time furnish to the other 
parties to this Agreement. 
(b) In the case of Employee, 6817 Elaine Way, San Diego, California, 92120 or 
to such other person or address as Employee may from time to time furnish to the other 
parties to this Agreement. 
12. ARBITRATION AND EOUIT ABLE RELIEF. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and Employee 
agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to any interpretation, 
construction, perfonnance, or breach of this Agreement shall be settled and decided by 
arbitration conducted by the American Arbitration Association in acpordance with the 
Co.nunercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, as then in effect, 
except as provided below. Any such arbitration shall be held and conducted in San Diego, 
California, before one arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties; 
if agreement is not reached on the selection of an arbitrator within ten (10) days, then 
such arbitrator shall be appointed by the presiding judge of San Diego Superior Court. 
The provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association shall apply and govern such arbitration, subject, however, to the following: 
( i) Any demand for arbitration shall be in writing and must be made 
within a reasonable time after the claim, dispute or other matter in 
question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for arbitration be 
made after the date that institution of legal or equitable proceedings 
based on such claim, dispute, or other matter would be barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
(ii) The arbitrator appointed must be a former or retired judge or an 
attorney with at least ten ( 10) years experience in commercial 
matters, or a non-attorney with like experience in the area of dispute. 
(iii) The arbitrator shall prepare in writing and provide to the parties 
factual findings and the reasons on which the decision of the 
arbitrator is based. 
00424 
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• hereunder shall be preswned to relate to an Invention made during the term of 
Employee's employment unless Employee can produce evidence to the contrary. 
12. INDEMNIFICATION BY EMPLOYER. Employer shall, to the 
maximum extent permitted by law, indemnify and hold Employee harmless against 
expenses~ including reasonable attorney's fees,judgments, fines, settlements, and other 
amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with any proceeding arising as a 
result of employment duties Employee performs for Employer in compliance with the 
terms of this Agreement. 
13. NOTICES. Any notices to be given hereunder by either party to the other 
shall be in writing and may be transmitted by personal delivery or by mail, registered or 
certified, postage prepaid with return receipt requested. Notices delivered personally 
shall be deemed communicated as of the date of the actual receipt; mailed notices shall be 
deemed communicated as of three (3) days after mailing. Mailed notices shall be 
addressed as follows: 
(a) In the case of Employer, 13975 Danielson Street, Poway, California 92064, 
or to such other person or address as Employer may from time to time furnish to the other 
parties to this Agreement. 
(b) In the case of Employee, 6817 EJaine Way, San Diego, California:, 92120 or 
to such other person or address as Employee may from time to time furnish to the other 
parties to this Agreement. 
14. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF. (a) Except as 
provided in subparagraph (b) below, the Employer and Employee agree that any dispute 
or controversy arising out of or relating to any interpretation, construction, performance, 
or breach of this Agreement shall be settled and decided by arbitration conducted by the 
American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association, as then in effect, except as provided below. Any 
such arbitration shall be held and conducted in San Diego, California, before one 
arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties; if agreement is not 
reached on the selection of an arbitrator within ten ( I 0) days, then such arbitrator shall be 
appointed by the presiding judge of San Diego Superior Court. 
The provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association sha11 apply and govern such arbitration, subject, however, to the following: 
(i) Any demand for arbitration shall be in writing and must be made 
-7-
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Joseph Edwards, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MemorandU111 Decision 
Michael Carey, Wendy Carey, 
Seirus Innovative Acc. Inc., 
Case No. 150905215 
Judge Marks. Kouris 
Defendants. 
In this action, Plaintiff Joseph Edwards asserts various 
claims against Defendants Michael (Michael) and Wendy (Wendy) 
Carey {collectively, the Careys), and Seirus Innovative 
Acces-sories, Inc. (the Company). The Careys now argue that all of 
Edwards' claims against them must be arbitrated pursuant to an 
arbitration provision in employment agreements that the Careys 
signed with the Company. 
BACKGROUND 
Edwards and the Careys formed the Company several years ago, 
with Michael and Edwards each owning 50 percent of the Company's 
stock. Since the Company's formation, Edwards and the Careys have 
served as the sole directors on the Company's board of directors. 
Until recently, they also served as the Company's primary 
00567 
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corporate officers, with Michael serving as CEO, Wendy serving as 
COO, and Edwards serving as CFO. Then, at a board of directors 
meeting, the Careys voted to remove Edwards as CFO and to trade 
debt owed to Michael and Edwards for additional stock in the 
Company (the debt-to-equity conversion). As a result of the debt-
to-equity conversion, Michael and Edwards now own unequal stock 
in the Company: Michael is now the majority stockholder, as he 
owns more than 50 percent of the stock in the Company, while 
Edwards owns less than so percent of the Company's stock and is 
the Company's minority shareholder. 
Following those decisions, Edwards brought this action 
against the Careys and the Company. In the Amended Complaint, 
Edwards alleges that the Careys acted improperly when they 
removed him as a corporate officer and forced him to trade debt 
that the Company owed him for stock. 
ANALYSIS 
The Careys now assert that, pursuant to a mandatory 
arbitration provision in employment agreements they signed with 
the Company, all of Edwards' claims against them must be 
arbitrated. In so asserting, the Careys acknowledge that the 
agreements were between the Careys and the Company, and that 
Edwards was not party to the employment agreements. However, the 
Careys claim that the employment agreements nevertheless apply 
because, in substance, Edwards' claims are actually derivative 
claims brought on behalf of the Company. See Richardson v. 
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980) · (stating that 
a derivative claim or suit "seek[s] to enforce any right which 
belongs to the corporation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In response, Edwards argues that the arbitration provision does 
not apply for two reasons: First, because the Careys took the 
2 
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actions in question as directors and the employment agreements 
only covered their activities as corporate officers and second, 
because the claims are not derivative claims. Therefore, to 
determine whether the arbitration provision applies, the Court 
must resolve two questions: (1) Whether the Careys' actions are 
within the scope of the employment agreements and (2) whether 
Edwards' claims are derivative or direct in nature. 
I. Were the Carey's actions with the scope of the employment 
agreements. 
In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, Edwards argues 
that his claims against the careys are for the actions they took 
as directors, and therefore, the employment agreements do not 
apply because the agreements only governed the actions taken by 
the Careys as officers of the Company, and do not apply to their 
actions as directors. 
In their reply memorandum, the Careys concede that the 
employment agreements only "govern the performance of their 
duties as officers of [the Company] .n (Reply Mem. at iii.) 
Nevertheless, the Careys maintain that the arbitration provision 
applies in this case because all of the actions in question 
"necessarily involve consideration of the Carey's conduct as 
officers." (Id. at 4.) The Careys are correct that because of the 
Company's management structure and their overlapping roles as 
directors and officers, it may be difficult to precisely 
determine which hat they were wearing at different times. It may 
even be the case that the Careys' work as corporate officers led 
them to recommend and ultimately approve the proposed actions in 
question. 
However, as Edwards notes, his claims against the Careys in 
the Amended Complaint are primarily asserted against the Careys 
3 
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for actions they took as directors of the Company. For example, 
the claims for conflict of interest and removal of directors 
relate solely to the Careys' actions and roles as directors 
rather than officers. Likewise, all of the other alleged actions 
in question, such as the debt-to-equity conversion and 
termination of Edwards' employment, were undertaken by the Careys 
at a meeting of the board of directors, rather than as part of 
their day-to-day activities as corporate officers. While the 
Careys are correct that there may be some overlap between those 
decisions and the Careys' performance of their duties as 
corporate officers, the allegations of the Amended Complaint 
clearly focus on the Careys' actions as directors of the Company, 
and Edwards has affirmatively stated that he is only pursuing 
claims against the Careys for their actions as directors. 
Therefore, based on the record currently before the Court and the 
Careys' concession that the employment agreements only cover 
their work as officers, this Court concludes that in fact, the 
employment agreements do not govern Edwards' claims in this case. 
Because this Court concludes that the employment agreements 
do not apply in this case, the question as to whether Edwards' 
claims are derivative or direct in nature is not addressed. 
·For these reasons, this Court DENIES the Careys' Motion to 
Compel Arbitration. 
DATED this ll t.h day of December 2015 . 
the Tturt: 
l6La..__,_,__-t~ ~ 
Marks. Kouris 
District Court Judge 
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